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From Aadhaar to BritCard: Lessons on Digital Identity and Social Equity

By Christabelle Quaynor, Policy and Influence Officer and Ditipriya Acharya, Senior Media, Marketing and Communications Officer


What is the BritCard?  

On September 25, 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a new digital identity scheme also known as the BritCard. This new Digital ID plan will primarily act as the proof you need to live and work in the UK.  This is an attempt to tackle the rise in illegal migrant crossings across the English Channel. 

Here's a simple look at how it's planned to work.

 

  • What it is: A secure digital ID stored right on your smartphone. 

  • How it works: Think of it like a digital version of the NHS App or your contactless bank card. It's a verifiable app you'll use to prove who you are. 

  • What it includes: The ID will contain your basic details (name, photo, date of birth, nationality) and your official residency status. 

  • Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer was very clear about the scheme's core function for employment: "You will not be able to work in the United Kingdom if you do not have digital ID. It's as simple as that." 

 

What is the response to the plan? 


Political response: The plan has already drawn sharp criticism from major political figures: 

 

Mass public opposition: The proposed digital ID system has generated significant public backlash, forcing an official response from the government. A petition demanding the government scrap the digital ID plan has received almost 3 million signatures. 

 

Despite the backlash, the government stated it will proceed with the digital ID plan within this Parliament, saying it will help "tackle illegal migration, make accessing government services easier, and enable wider efficiencies." Next, the government will launch a public consultation soon to work out the final details and seek to introduce legislation. 

 

Why are people critical of the proposal?  


1. False promise of efficiency:  

The proposal claims to simplify right-to-work and right-to-rent checks but would instead digitise the “hostile environment”, increasing surveillance and exclusion. 

 

2. Data sensitivity and security risks: 

The topic of personal data is extremely sensitive, and recent scandals have rightly made many people protective of their information.   Data breaches generally fall into two categories: 

  • In the 2010s, for example, the British consulting firm Cambridge Analytica collected personal data from millions of Facebook users without their informed consent. This deep intrusion was then used for political advertising, demonstrating how easily data misuse can affect democracy. 

  • Data can also be exposed through simple human error or accident. In March 2017, spam operator River City Media accidentally published an unprotected backup snapshot from January 2017. This resulted in the exposure of 1.37 billion records, making it one of the largest data breaches in history. 

     

3. Misuse of Windrush lessons:  

Labour Together wrongly suggests digital IDs could prevent another Windrush scandal, ignoring that the scandal resulted from state policy and evidence destruction, not lack of ID.  


4. Risk of mass surveillance:  

Critics warn the system could easily be misused to enable mass surveillance or evolve into an unchecked tool of state control, described as a ‘hacker’s dream’

 

5. Digital exclusion:  

Around 1.7 million UK households lack internet access, and 2.4 million people struggle with basic online tasks (Digital Exclusion, House of Lords).   A major three-year study has found that the rapid digitisation of essential services, such as energy, healthcare, and housing, is deepening inequalities, particularly for Black and Minoritised Ethnic communities and those with limited English proficiency. As more services move online, there is a growing risk that digitalisation will widen existing inequalities rather than close them. 

 

What can we learn from the Indian context? 

There are notable parallels between the UK's proposed BritCards and India's Aadhaar system and National Register of Citizens. 


India’s Aadhaar card system, introduced in 2009 and first issued in 2010, is the country’s central digital identity platform combining biometric and demographic data into a unique 12-digit number for each resident. It stands as the world’s largest biometric ID project, revolutionising access to government and private services but also raising critical privacy and inclusion concerns. The program’s primary goal was to streamline welfare delivery by reducing duplication and fraud, while fostering financial and social inclusion, especially among marginalised groups. Although originally voluntary, Aadhaar enrollment now covers over 99% of Indian adults


By 2025, regulations have tightened, enforcing stricter document verification and removing duplicates to strengthen the system. While widely accepted as proof of identity and address, Aadhaar does not confer citienship


Though Aadhaar has considerably reduced fraud and leakage in welfare programs and accelerated India's digital transformation, it has sparked ongoing legal and social debates on privacy, consent, and exclusion. Supreme Court rulings have shaped its application, mandating voluntary enrollment and restricting some uses. Security concerns linger, due to the centralisation of sensitive biometric and demographic data and instances of data breaches. 


Coverage is nearly universal, but vulnerable populations—including migrants, homeless persons, and stateless individuals—still face access barriers and exclusion. Authentication failures particularly affect the poor, elderly, and those with worn biometric marks or lacking digital literacy, sometimes leading to denial of essential services or benefits. The system’s complexity also introduces bureaucratic challenges and complicates grievance redressal for ordinary users. 

Data privacy issues arise from fears of mass surveillance and unauthorised profiling, especially as Aadhaar links to critical services. Several data leaks have exposed personal and biometric information, with journalists revealing vulnerabilities exploited for illicit access. Despite enhanced encryption and security protocols, rapid technological advances continue to pose risks such as phishing and insider threats. 


While initially designed for inclusion, Aadhaar’s deployment has at times resulted in exclusion—particularly for marginalised individuals impacted by the National Register of Citizens and similar policies. Proposals to add citizenship verification layers and AI-driven fake document detection aim to help authorities distinguish legal residents from undocumented migrants, tightening security but also raising concerns about misuse. Illegal migrants have sometimes obtained Aadhaar through fraudulent means, enabling further access to official documents and benefits, which officials acknowledge contributes to demographic and political tensions. Conversely, stricter regulations risk denying access to basic services for genuine migrants and refugees. 


The National Register of Citizens (NRC) in India is an official record of all Indian citizens, created to distinguish genuine citizens from illegal immigrants. Originally prepared in 1951 after India's first post-independence census, the NRC gained renewed relevance in Assam, where it was updated between 2013 and 2019 following a Supreme Court mandate. The goal of the NRC is to identify and document legal citizens, allowing authorities to detect and potentially deport individuals deemed illegal immigrants—particularly those who entered India from Bangladesh without valid documentation. The update process for Assam used electoral rolls up to 1971 and various other approved documents as verification, resulting in the exclusion of about 1.9 million applicants from the final citizenship list in 2019. Calls for a nationwide NRC have sparked public debate and controversy, with critics arguing the process may lead to discrimination and statelessness for many vulnerable groups.  


At the heart of the controversy lies the exclusionary design of the NRC process, where nearly two million Assam residents—many of whom are vulnerable, poor, or from minority backgrounds—were left off the citizenship roll due to strict documentation requirements, including birth and educational certificates that are often unavailable because of historical state failures. Experts highlight that millions, especially marginalised communities, risk disenfranchisement simply because the state has not adequately registered their documents. 


Critics also argue that combining the NRC with the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) creates a discriminatory citizenship test, explicitly protecting non-Muslim migrants while exposing Muslims and some other minorities to statelessness, arbitrary detention, and even deportation—contravening constitutional guarantees of equality and nondiscrimination. Legal scholars and human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Freedom House, warn that this approach can be weaponised against dissenters, with additional powers granted to cancel Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cards and target journalists, academics, and protestors expressing critical opinions. The NRC’s exclusion also has practical consequences, such as freezing biometric data (Aadhaar), which prevents access to welfare and government services for those omitted from the final registry. 

 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the BritCard proposal represents a major step in modernising the UK’s identity verification system by digitising proof of residency and legal status for all adult residents. The plan has sparked widespread debate and opposition, with concerns about privacy, data security, digital exclusion, and potential state surveillance voiced by millions. International examples like India’s Aadhaar illustrate how digital ID systems, while promising efficiency, can unintentionally deepen social inequalities and marginalise vulnerable groups. 


Critically, experts argue that technological solutions like BritCard cannot succeed without systemic reform of existing verification policies, which currently perpetuate barriers and exclusion. Without addressing foundational problems—such as lack of accessible documentation and the discriminatory effects of hostile environment policies—digitalisation risks codifying these inequalities rather than resolving them. Sustainable progress requires reforms focused on fairness, transparency, and inclusivity to avoid expanding surveillance and injustice under the guise of technological advancement. Only then can digital identity systems like BritCard truly serve all UK residents equitably and regain public trust. 

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